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Nearly all states are thinking about reforming their welfare systems, and several
states—particularly those that offer high welfare benefits—are taking action.  A major concern is that
poor people are moving to high-benefit states in order to receive the benefits offered by those states.  It
is unclear, however, if this "welfare migration" is extensive enough to break the budgets of high-benefit
states.  Nevertheless, legislators in those states are seeking to stop it, usually through two-tier benefit
schedules whereby new arrivals to a state are temporarily paid the welfare benefits they would have
received had they remained in their original state.  The authors discuss the extent to which two-tier
benefit schedules represent substantive reform or symbolic action.  In their estimation, current
strategies for welfare reform fail to address the causes of poverty and welfare dependency and may
only intensify the antagonism many Americans feel toward the poor.Interstate Variation in Welfare Benefits and the Migration of the Poor:
Substantive Concerns and Symbolic Responses
Welfare reform has been back on the national agenda since President Clinton announced in his
1994 State of the Union Address that he means to "end welfare as we know it."   At the center of his
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attack on welfare is a two-year time limit for the receipt of public assistance.   Rather than waiting for
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the President's plan to make its way through Congress, states have been developing their own reforms
in response to the pressure to reduce the welfare rolls and cut costs.  States have been experimenting
extensively in trying to reduce people's reliance on public assistance, especially since the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 granted them authority to experiment with welfare-to-work
programs.   Subsequently, a "new paternalism" has engulfed the states and they have sought waivers
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from the federal government authorizing them to demonstrate the effectiveness of various conditions
attached to receiving public assistance.
4
Given the substantial discretion states have in the decentralized system for providing public
assistance, including the setting of benefits, national welfare reform has proven hard to achieve.  
5
Getting states to agree on uniform standards for public assistance has historically been difficult.  The
recent state reforms, in fact, in part reflect an interstate conflict—the issue of "welfare magnets" or the
idea that relatively high benefits in some states encourage people to move in from other states in order
to receive those high benefits.   While the evidence for this sort of "welfare migration" is sparse and
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highly contestable, state policymakers have not only been talking about this controversial issue but are
taking actions.  Most commonly, their responses take the form of erecting two-tier benefit schedules
that offer newcomers for a period of time the benefits they would have received if they had stayed in
their previous states of residence.   Although the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969 struck down state
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durational residency requirements in Shapiro v. Thompson as unconstitutional violations of a citizen's
Ninth Amendment implied right to travel,  several states have sought to use two-tier benefit schedules
8
to impose durational residency requirements for receiving full benefits in those states.  The espoused2
goal is to discourage welfare migration from other states.   As the following analysis suggests, some
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state policymakers may very well be concerned about welfare migration as a substantive issue;
however, two-tier proposals may be little more than weak gestures in the symbolism of welfare magnet
politics.
The analysis that follows examines the welfare magnet issue and its consequences for the
system of providing public assistance in the United States.   First we review data on interstate variation
in benefit levels in order to see whether states are allowing the welfare magnet issue to affect benefit
levels.  Then we examine the evidence on welfare migration to assess the extent to which it can be said
that people move from one state to another in order to receive higher welfare benefits.  Following that
is a consideration of the substantive and symbolic dimensions of the welfare magnet issue.  Next we
look at the specific responses being proposed by states.  We follow this with a consideration of the
legality of these proposed responses and conclude with a discussion of alternatives.
BENEFIT DECLINE:  A COMPETITION TO THE BOTTOM?
While the welfare magnet issue has come to include efforts by states to restrict access to public
assistance generally, most efforts attempt to prevent new residents of a state from taking full advantage
of that state's Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.   AFDC is the main public
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assistance program for non-aged poor families with children.   Since its creation by the Social Security
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Act of 1935, AFDC has been a national-state program in which the federal government sets basic
guidelines and reimburses states for some of the costs of the program (in recent years, 50 percent to 80
percent, depending on the ratio of state per capita income to national per capita income).  States
continue to have substantial discretion in AFDC, including the ability to set benefit levels.  As Paul
Peterson and Mark Rom have emphasized, the variation in benefits has historically been wide.   In
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1960 for the forty-eight contiguous states and Washington, D.C., monthly benefits for a four-person3
family with no other income varied from a low of $50 in Mississippi to a high of $230 in
Washington—almost a fivefold difference.  As of 1993 benefits ranged from $633 a month for a family
of three with no income in California to $120 in Mississippi, still approximately a fivefold difference.
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Comparing the difference in benefits between the most generous state (California) and the least
generous state (Mississippi) does not give us a representative picture of the variation in benefits, since
the benefits in California and Mississippi are considerably higher and lower, respectively, than the
average state benefit.  For this reason, we have organized states into low-, medium-, and high-benefit
groups based on their benefits in 1960.  When examined from this perspective, it becomes apparent that
although the variation in benefits persists, the gap is narrowing.  As shown in Table 1, the difference
between the low and high groups declined from 1960 to 1989.  The average monthly benefit for a four-
person family with no countable income in 1960 was $362.75 in low-benefit states and $821.69 in high-
benefit states—a difference of $458.94; by 1989, the corresponding figures were $298.19 and $513.35,
a $215.16 difference.  This reduction in the gap has accompanied a decline in the real value of benefits,
particularly in high-benefit states.  It is possible that other states have supplanted the previously high
benefit states and that the variation in benefits was as wide in 1989 as in 1960.  Yet, examination of the
standard deviation in these benefits for each year indicates that the variation in state AFDC benefits
began to decline markedly after 1975.   There indeed has been a reduction in the variation of AFDC
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benefits coming with a decline in the real value of those benefits, especially in the high-benefit states. 
Nonetheless, the persistence of a substantial amount of variation across the states in AFDC benefits
remains a real phenomenon that logically is a concern for policymakers who are worried about their
states becoming welfare magnets. 4
TABLE 1
Average Monthly AFDC Benefits for a Four-Person Family with No Other Income,
by State Benefit Levels in 1960
(in 1989 Dollars)
Low-Benefit States Medium-Benefit States High-Benefit States All States
1960 $362.75 $611.59 $821.69 $603.23
1964 377.69 600.08 773.71 587.71
1968 411.77 679.41 821.83 641.43
1970 399.62 715.15 804.63 643.17
1975 383.74 660.84 730.73 594.61
1980 335.79 563.04 640.73 515.78
1985 308.44 481.11 553.27 449.77
1989 298.19 472.06 513.35 429.63
N 16 16 17 49
Percentage Change
1960–1989 -17.80 -22.81 -37.53 -28.78
1975–1989 -22.29 -28.57 -29.75 -27.75
Sources:  See Appendix.
Notes:  The numbers in the table are averages for each group of states.  Alaska and Hawaii are not
included because 1960 data for them are not available.  The District of Columbia is included.  States
are divided into thirds according to their AFDC benefit levels in 1960.5
One possible factor in both reducing the variation across states and decreasing the real value of
AFDC benefits over time is the Food Stamp program.   Originally offered in some counties by the
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national government as early as World War II, the Food Stamp program was expanded by the Food
Stamp Act of 1964.  Changes enacted by Congress in 1970 and in the Agriculture and Consumer
Protection Act of 1973 made Food Stamps available across the country on a uniform basis annually
adjusted for changes in the cost of living.  While the nationalized Food Stamp program was intended to
replace national food commodity distribution programs which had been available since the 1930s, it
was also intended to supplement other income including AFDC.  Yet, there is evidence that many states
have substituted Food Stamps for part of the AFDC grant.   National increases in Food Stamp benefits
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have allowed state policymakers to forego increasing AFDC.  This seems to be especially true of
policymakers in high-benefit states where perhaps the feeling was prevalent that benefits were already
high enough and supplemental Food Stamps were unnecessary (see the "High States" column in Table
1).  Even if it were more frequently practiced in high-benefit states, there is evidence that all states
participated in substitution that allowed AFDC benefits to decline (compare the decline in each of the
columns in Table 1).  All states have witnessed erosion in their real AFDC benefits since the
establishment of a nationwide Food Stamp program.  The average decline exceeded one-quarter of the
real value of the monthly benefit, falling from $594.61 in 1975 to $429.63 in 1989 for a four-person
family with no other income (see "All States" column in Table 1).  The decline in high-benefit states
was more than one-third of the real value of the grant, while the decline in low-benefit states was below
one-fifth.
In assessing benefit change, we therefore need to look at the combined AFDC–Food Stamp
package.  Since 1974, Food Stamps—which, unlike AFDC, is funded entirely by the federal
government—has been added to the benefit package of all but a few AFDC recipients.  Food Stamps
boosts the real value of public assistance in all states:  in 1993, the monthly benefit for a family of three6
with no income was $632 when Food Stamps and AFDC were combined, but only $391 just counting
AFDC; Food Stamps represents a substantial and growing proportion of the benefit package and helps
to reduce the variation across states.
The major effect that Food Stamps has had in reducing variation in welfare benefits is found in
the way Food Stamp benefits are calculated.   While Food Stamps provides benefits to all eligible low-
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income families on the basis of their income, including AFDC, the program uses a reduction rate of $1
in Food Stamps for approximately every $3 in income.  Since Food Stamps are fully federally funded
and AFDC is only partially federally funded (according to state per capita income so that it is almost
always the case that high-AFDC-benefit states tend to receive federal support for a lower proportion of
their benefits than low-benefit states), states stand to lose about $.30 in fully federally funded Food
Stamps for every $1.00 increase in partially federally funded AFDC (with the loss usually greater in
high-benefit states).  All states, including most especially high-benefit states, have the incentive to
forego raising AFDC in order to maximize their receipt of Food Stamps.   Therefore, the system for
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financing Food Stamps not only discourages raising AFDC grants, it also reduces variation across the
states.
Food Stamps reduces variation not just in AFDC benefits but in the combined AFDC–Food
Stamp package as well.  The higher a family's AFDC monthly benefit, the lower their Food Stamp
allocation.  Recipients in low-AFDC-benefit states get more Food Stamps than recipients in
high-benefit states.  The net result is that Food Stamps had by 1989 reduced the variation in benefits
across states markedly—from about 6 to 1 from the highest to the lowest state when only AFDC is
counted ($144 to $824.01) to about 2.2 to 1 when AFDC and Food Stamps are combined ($403.81 to
$879.80).   The standard deviation for combined AFDC–Food Stamp benefits has declined consistently
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since 1975, indicating that this combined package has not only reduced variation in benefits across the
states but that the variation is declining.   This reduced variation is in good part attributable to the
207
decline in benefits among higher-benefit states which, according to Table 2, allowed their monthly
combined AFDC–Food Stamp benefits for a family of four with no other income to decline (in constant
1989 dollars) from an average of $858.47 in 1975 to $662.35 in 1989.
Substantial variation in benefits across the states, however, continues even when Food Stamps
are counted along with AFDC.   One reason for the continued variation is that all other states also
allowed their combined grants to decline, if not quite as steeply as the high-benefit states (see Table 2). 
Therefore, taking Food Stamps into account does not eliminate the benefit variation that can breed fear
of "welfare magnets."  In 1989, the monthly combined AFDC–Food Stamp benefit (in 1989 dollars) for
a family of four with no other income in high-benefit states was on average $662.35 compared to
$511.73 for low-benefit states—enough of a gap for some policymakers to fill with the welfare magnet
issue.
Some analysts have considered the welfare package to include Medicaid as well.   Costing out
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the real value of Medicaid to recipients is technically difficult and theoretically questionable.  In the
extreme case, it seems nonsensical to add the cost of a life-ending operation to the buying-power of a
deceased recipient.  Yet, free medical care under Medicaid reduces the need to devote other funds to
paying for a health insurance policy.  With that in mind, Table 3 examines the change in value and
variation across the states of the combined AFDC–Food Stamp–Medicaid package.   The figures in
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Table 3 in good part replicate the trends in Table 2:  reduction in variation, decreases in benefits,
greater declines among high-benefit states, and the persistence of enough variation so that some states
will freeze their benefit levels to avoid becoming a welfare magnet.
In a critique of Peterson and Rom, Thomas Dye adds to their evidence of persistent variation in
welfare benefits across states.   But unlike Peterson and Rom, Dye does not believe that states take
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their cues from each other in setting benefit levels, nor does he feel that the decentralized system of
providing public assistance works to the disadvantage of the poor.  Yet, both Dye and Peterson and8
TABLE 2
Average Monthly AFDC–Food Stamp Benefits for a Four-Person Family with No Other Income,
by State Benefit Levels in 1960
(in 1989 Dollars)
Low-Benefit States Medium-Benefit States High-Benefit States All States
1960 $362.75 $611.59 $821.69 $603.23
1964 377.69 600.08 773.71 587.71
1968 588.96 776.31 876.00 749.79
1970 582.77 803.66 866.27 753.25
1975 615.58 809.55 858.47 763.18
1980 762.25 707.86 762.25 674.79
1985 523.78 644.64 695.15 622.70
1989 511.73 633.44 662.35 603.73
N 16 16 17 49
Percentage Change
1960–1989 41.07 0.04 -19.39 0.00
1975–1989 -16.87 -22.91 -22.85 -20.89
Sources:  See Appendix.
Notes:  The numbers in the table are averages for each group of states.  Alaska and Hawaii are not
included because 1960 data for them are not available.  The District of Columbia is included.  States
are divided into thirds according to their AFDC benefit levels in 1960.9
TABLE 3
Average Monthly AFDC–Food Stamp–Medicaid Benefits for a Four-Person Family
with No Other Income, by State Benefit Levels in 1960
(in 1989 Dollars)
Low-Benefit States Medium-Benefit States High-Benefit States All States
1960 $362.75 $611.59 $821.69 $603.23
1964 377.69 600.08 773.71 587.71
1968 635.33 841.40 954.42 813.32
1970 631.97 872.70 949.48 820.73
1975 673.65 891.06 956.68 842.87
1980 619.06 787.91 857.19 756.81
1985 599.64 723.71 791.44 706.70
1989 593.71 723.19 770.16 697.21
N 16 16 17 49
Percentage Change
1960–1989 63.67 18.25 -6.27 15.58
1975–1989 -11.87 -18.84 -19.50 -17.28
Sources:  See Appendix.
Notes:  The numbers in the table are averages for each group of states.  Alaska and Hawaii are not
included because 1960 data for them are not available.  The District of Columbia is included.  States
are divided into thirds according to their AFDC benefit levels in 1960.10
Rom are mistaken about the extent to which variation in benefits has persisted.  Their mistake comes
from using an inappropriate statistic to assess variation in the real value of benefits.   This leads them
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to understate the extent to which variation in state AFDC benefit levels has declined over the last thirty
years.  Figure 1 graphs AFDC benefits in the forty-eight contiguous states and Washington, D.C., from
1968 to 1989 and shows a decline in variation that cannot be dismissed by statistical calculation.
Dye also misstates the way in which benefit variation and interstate competition in benefits can
easily co-exist.  It is distinctly possible that states that historically have had higher AFDC benefit levels
have in the last twenty years become increasingly concerned about whether they are welfare magnets
and have responded in ways which have reduced, but not eliminated, variation.  Variation continues but
declines under these circumstances—just as our data indicate. Therefore, while variation persists, it
may not so much be an indication of how states make AFDC benefit decisions in isolation as much as
that variation is itself a point of concern which state policymakers, particularly in historically high
benefit states, take into account in setting public assistance levels.
Our data then not only provide evidence about benefit variation and benefit decline; they also
provide a basis for suggesting that state policymakers could be setting AFDC benefit levels with an eye
towards how their actions compare with other states, as they do in other areas of public policy.   There
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has been a strong tendency for high-benefit states since the mid-1970s to let their benefits decline in
real value at a faster rate than benefits in other states, bringing their benefits more in line with the
average state, reducing variation across the states, and contributing to an overall decline in benefits. 
High-benefit states resist raising their benefits, more so than relatively low benefit states.  These (non-
)actions have further reinforced the ongoing decline in welfare benefits among all states.  Between
1975 and 1989, the real value of the combined AFDC–Food Stamp–Medicaid monthly benefit for a
four-person family with no countable income dropped in real terms 17 percent in the11
Figure 1 here12
average state, from $824.84 to $697.21 (measured in 1989 dollars).  A similar pattern exists for the
combined AFDC–Food Stamp package and an even steeper decline for AFDC benefits alone.  In all
three cases, high-benefit states have led the way in allowing their benefits to decline.  This trend has
continued into the 1990s, with AFDC benefits declining from 1975 to 1993 an average of 34 percent in
real terms.   It is true that many factors may be helping to produce these results, including economic
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slowdowns, taxpayer revolts, state deficits, and an increasingly chilly political climate for welfare.  The
dynamics of financing public assistance itself (and Food Stamps in particular) is a factor in
discouraging increases in high-benefit states.  But a strong case can be made that the welfare magnet
issue is making its contribution, if not as a real concern among policymakers, then as a convenient
symbol rationalizing benefit reductions and exploiting the fear among voters that their state does risk
becoming a welfare magnet.   While alternative explanations for this phenomenon need to be
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considered, there is good reason to think that this pattern is in part attributable to policymakers' fears in
some states about having to shoulder the responsibility for the poor from other states.  Although these
fears may not be grounded in evidence and may actually be misplaced, they are very real.  They lead
states to make welfare policies that contribute to the decline in benefits and to devise schemes that offer
lower benefits to new residents.
IS THERE "WELFARE MIGRATION"?
    What is the factual basis for those fears about welfare magnets?  The research on welfare
migration has grown in recent years with additional studies.  As Dye has explained, "[e]arly studies
suggested that the poor migrate for job opportunities and family reasons with little knowledge of
welfare rules and payments in various jurisdictions.  More recent studies suggest that the poor migrate
opposite net flows and toward high benefit states."   Even more recent studies than those reviewed by
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Dye cast doubt on the extent to which there is significant welfare migration.   Yet, the cumulative
2913
effect is heightened inconclusiveness.  Major reviews of the numerous studies on whether people
migrate for higher benefits leave the picture very cloudy indeed.
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A thoughtful analysis has been completed by James R. Walker.   He provides evidence
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suggesting there is not a welfare migration phenomenon.  Identifying possible welfare magnet flows
between contiguous states where one state offers a grant at least $100 higher, Walker examined the net
migration of families likely to qualify for AFDC across contiguous border counties in order to develop
a control for regional effects.  Using census data, he found as much out-migration to the border county
in the lower-benefit state as in-migration to the border county in the higher-benefit state.  But because
Walker's study is limited to border counties, it can by no means be considered definitive.
Peterson and Rom also stress Walker's point at looking at net migration but articulate a
different understanding of what "net" means.  Based on their study of the welfare magnet controversy
in Wisconsin, Peterson and Rom suggest that "The Wisconsin case vividly illustrates several
characteristics of state policymaking systems throughout the United States.  First, the welfare magnet
debate in Wisconsin, as elsewhere, focused exclusively and misleadingly on the effect of welfare
benefits on the in-migration of poor people.  The effects on outward migration do not have the same
political significance, and therefore both sides in the debate ignored one-half of the relevant
information. . . . No matter how misleading the evidence relied upon in this debate, there was little
doubt that the magnet issue affected formulation of welfare policy."   Yet, when Peterson and Rom
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discuss the net effect of welfare out- and in-migration, they include people remaining in the state as
well as moving out and coming in.  In other words, they are interested in specifying the effect of
benefits in retaining in-state recipients who might otherwise leave as well as attracting welfare
recipients who arrive from out of state.  Their primary conclusion from examining data for the forty-
eight contiguous states and Washington, D.C., is that welfare benefits have a significant "net" effect in
this sense of the term.  They find that states with relatively high benefits at one point in time tend to see14
their poor populations growing over the subsequent period.   They suggest that this occurs in part
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because states are retaining recipients if not attracting them, or some combination of both.  For
Peterson and Rom, this sort of net effect is sufficient to make it understandable that some states are
concerned about being welfare magnets even if most often they relied on inadequate information to
frame their concerns.  Peterson and Rom write: 
State redistributive policies are less generous than a national
policy in part because low-income people are sensitive to interstate
differences in welfare policy.  This does not mean that large numbers
of poor people rush from one state to another with every modest
adjustment in state benefit levels.  But the data do suggest that over
time, as people make major decisions about whether they should move
or remain where they are, they take into account the level of welfare a
state provides and the extent to which that level is increasing.  The poor
do this to the same extent that they respond to differences in wage
opportunities in other states.
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If it turns out that welfare migration is largely about retention rather than attraction, then
two-tier welfare benefit schedules are likely to have little effect on a state's AFDC caseload.  It is
possible that retention is a qualitatively different problem, if no less important, than attraction and that
the proponents of two-tier benefit schedules are focusing on attraction.
Thomas Corbett's review of the literature leads to even more ambivalence about welfare
migration.   His analysis of the available evidence is particularly noteworthy for its comments on the
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conceptual problems with studying welfare migration, many of which revolve around the difficulty of
identifying in census or other data the specific act of moving from one state to another in order to
receive higher welfare benefits.   Many studies simply study surrogate phenomena that leave their
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results open to question.  For instance, most studies concern the movement of persons living in poverty,
overlooking or at least deemphasizing the fact that most persons in poverty do not receive public
assistance.   Second, studies that attempt to isolate welfare migration risk neglecting how such
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interstate moves are the result of decisions involving a variety of factors, with the availability of better
welfare benefits being in many cases probably not a very significant factor even among persons living15
in poverty or currently receiving welfare.  In addition, "push" factors such as high crime rates may
weigh more heavily in the migration decision than a "pull" factor like higher welfare benefits.  Yet,
only a few isolated surveys of newly arrived persons have sought to account for push factors.  No study,
for example, has been completed that specifically accounts for the effect of differential crime rates on
welfare migration.  Third, it is probably more meaningful to assess welfare migration for particular
states than to try to estimate its extent nationally.  For this reason, in recent years as certain states, such
as California, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, have become concerned about being a welfare
magnet, they have commissioned studies specific to their states.
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Corbett offers many good suggestions about what needs to be done if future research is to
clarify the issue.  First, he emphasizes that we should not naively assume that sound data will always
puncture social myths that are often the basis for public policy; instead, we need to recognize that such
myths may thrive and influence public policy not in spite of data but because of data.  Strong myths can
influence the production of research as well the making of public policy.  This has proven to be
particularly problematic on the welfare magnet issue.  Policymakers who are keen to take action in the
name of stemming the tide of out-of-staters seeking public assistance have at times commissioned
studies and twisted interpretation of results to reinforce pre-established prejudices about the poor and
welfare recipients.
Second, Corbett pleads for "conceptual clarity" that will enable researchers to specify just what
it is they mean by "welfare migration" so that they can identify it when they see it.  Third, he wants
better standards of proof than, for instance, simply indicating that a certain percentage of recipients
come from out of state or that a certain percentage of poor persons moved from one state to another. 
Last, Corbett hopes for evidence that is better related to policy.
This last point is particularly well-worth stressing on the welfare magnet issue.  For instance, it
might very well be the case that the welfare migration issue ought to be seen, as Peterson and Rom16
have argued, as one of retention as well as attraction.  If that is the case, then the two-tier benefit
schedules being proposed by states in order to stem the alleged tide of welfare migration very much
miss the mark.   In any case, the lack of definitive research on welfare migration means that for now
any policy changes dedicated to addressing the welfare magnet issue are suspect.
SYMBOLS VS. SUBSTANCE IN THE WELFARE MAGNET ISSUE
The rush to make policy without strong evidence that there is indeed a problem of welfare
migration into a state ought to raise questions.  Whether states ought to be concerned about becoming
welfare magnets, whether concern among policymakers is actually contributing to the decline in
benefits, and whether they can legally implement the actions that are currently being initiated are issues
at the forefront of interstate relations today.  Then again, it is important to realize that talk about
changes in public assistance, such as two-tier benefit schedules, has both substantive and symbolic
qualities.  Substantively, state policymakers are hoping that attaching conditions to the receipt of public
assistance will lead recipients to behave appropriately (i.e., in ways that will lessen their need to rely on
public assistance).  Symbolically, state policymakers are hoping that tightening the conditions under
which people receive assistance will not so much as force recipients to behave as intended as deter
people from coming onto or staying on the welfare rolls.
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It is therefore distinctly possible that the growing interest among state policymakers in the
welfare magnet issue may have both substantive and symbolic dimensions, with one dimension being
stressed over the other in different instances.  In some states, talk of restricting the access of newly
arrived persons to public assistance or, more commonly, of two-tier benefit schedules with persons
coming from out of state receiving lower benefits or the benefits of their former state may be just
that—talk, designed to denigrate the receipt of public assistance and discourage attempts to improve
assistance and generally make welfare-taking even more unpopular than it already is.  Policymakers17
interested in using the symbol of "welfare magnets" for the rhetorical purpose of rationalizing
tightening and cutting public assistance have no need for sound data.  Yet competent research could
hopefully play a role in impeding such symbolic politics.
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At the extreme, rhetoric about "welfare magnets" tends to blend into xenophobia.  Fear of
outsiders of all kinds and how they pose a threat to a state's established way of life is easily detectable
not too far beneath the surface of much "welfare magnet" rhetoric.  Such talk cannot only appear racist
but is.   The symbol of the "welfare magnet" follows up on the exploitive effects of the infamous
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Willie Horton advertisement that Bush supporters ran in the 1988 presidential campaign.  Welfare
magnet rhetoric also allows welfare recipients to be lumped in with other outsiders as a collective class
of persons who should not qualify as full citizens entitled to the benefits the state has to offer.  Newly
arrived welfare recipients are to be considered disenfranchised as much as illegal immigrants.
In fact, policymakers in California and other states are increasingly speaking and acting in ways
that are blurring the distinction between out-of-state U.S. citizens who come seeking benefits and
illegal immigrants.  California's Governor Pete Wilson has been particularly insistent on pushing the
Clinton administration to deny benefits to U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants so as to discourage
non-U.S. citizens, especially from Mexico and other parts of Latin America, from coming to California
to bear children and qualify for public assistance.   The welfare magnet issue can be conveniently used
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to fan the flames of xenophobia and generate support for reductions in public assistance to even U.S.
citizens, whether they are children of non-citizens or just people coming from another state.   Welfare
magnet rhetoric can help intensify an "us" vs. "them" mentality that encourages treating welfare
recipients as "others" who do not deserve "our" support.  Stressing the welfare magnet issue makes
cutting the welfare budget even easier than it normally is.18
Yet, some policymakers are earnestly concerned about welfare migration as a substantive issue
and are trying to limit newly arrived recipients' access to the same benefits received by long-time
residents.
TWO-TIER BENEFITS AND THE WAIVER PROCESS
Regardless of whether the welfare magnet issue is more symbol than substance, states are
taking action with real consequences for the benefits provided to newly arrived applicants for public
assistance.  States are attempting to institute legal restrictions denying newcomers access to the same
benefits that long-time residents can receive even though the United States Supreme Court struck down
durational residency requirements in 1969 in the Shapiro decision.  Since then, newly arrived families
have been able to receive public assistance when they met other eligibility requirements, prompting
states to become increasingly concerned about whether their benefit levels attract recipients from other
states. 
With Shapiro, there was good reason to think that the durational residency requirement would
become a relic of the past.  In the last few years with the growing concern about the welfare magnet
issue, renewed interest in durational residency requirements has reached new levels of intensity with
several states creating commissions to study the issue and recommend action.  States like Wisconsin
have not just studied the issue but have acted.  Concerned in particular about people moving from
Chicago to Milwaukee, Wisconsin has sought to offer new arrivals lower benefits.  Using the "waiver
process" initiated by the federal government, Wisconsin has gained approval to start an experiment in
1995 where new arrivals will be provided benefits for six months at the rate of their former state,
thereby creating a two-tier AFDC benefit schedule.  California has adopted a similar schedule that pays
new arrivals for one year at the benefit level of their state of origin.  Illinois offers new state migrants a
set reduced benefit for one year.  Wyoming has applied for a waiver to limit for twelve months the19
grant level of families moving to the state to the lesser of either the Wyoming state grant or that of the
state of origin.  Other states are contemplating doing the same.
The two-tier benefit schedule therefore has emerged as the most popular state innovation for
addressing the welfare magnet issue.  Yet, making a two-tier benefit schedule part of a state AFDC
program requires approval of the federal government.  Before Shapiro v. Thompson, states could set
durational residency requirements for AFDC benefits without making a special request to the federal
government to exempt them from the general guidelines for establishing an acceptable state AFDC
program that qualified under the Social Security Act for receiving federal reimbursements.  Now states
need to obtain a waiver from the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in
order to make such a change in their AFDC program.   President Bush promoted the waiver process in
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his January 1992 State of Union Address as a way to enable states to "reform the welfare system."   By
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the end of the Bush administration, eleven states had gained approval and six more were awaiting
approval for new waivers to revise parts of their AFDC programs.  Most often the waivers authorized
experimentation or demonstration programs for limited durations and geographic areas, usually for
several years and usually for selected counties.  By the time President Clinton committed himself in his
January 1994 State of the Union Address to "end welfare as we know it," six states had submitted
requests or gained approval for waivers authorizing two-tier benefit schedules that in one way or
another offered newly arrived persons to the state different AFDC benefits than those offered to
recipients who had been living in the state for an extended time.
4520
THE LEGAL LIMIT ON INTERSTATE RESTRICTIONS
The legality of these changes is in doubt.  The U.S. Supreme Court on January 18, 1994, let
stand a Supreme Court of Minnesota decision in Mitchell v. Steffen (504 N.W. 2nd 198, Minn. 1993)
that overturned the state's 1991 legislation instituting a two-tier benefit schedule for the state's General
Assistance program that provided newly arrived recipients with "60 percent benefits for 6 months." 
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the two-tier benefit schedule in question "`penalizes' the
fundamental constitutional right to migrate."  In its decision, the Court noted, "The assumption that out-
of-state poor people move to a new state because of higher welfare benefits is apparently unproven and
in some doubt.  There are many factors to account for migrating to Minnesota, such as job
opportunities, the presence of family and friends, etc.  Then, too, the net impact of in-migration and
out-migration has been estimated at about zero."
46
Whether the Minnesota decision is a fatal blow to the idea of two-tier benefit schedules remains
an open question.  States want to establish such schemes and the federal government has been willing to
approve them.  Governor Tommy Thompson's administration in Wisconsin is hoping that its two-tier
benefit schedule will survive constitutional challenge on the grounds that, unlike Minnesota's plan,
Wisconsin's calls for the state to pay newcomers the benefits of their previous state even if they are
higher than Wisconsin's.  Their argument is that their particular two-tier benefit schedule does not
discriminate against newcomers and does not prohibit their Ninth Amendment right to travel because
they are in each case entitled to receive the benefits of their previous state.   Wyoming's proposal for a
47
two-tier benefit schedule was eventually rejected by Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna
Shalala, because it applied a set benefit to the newly arrived just as Minnesota's two-tier schedule did
for its General Assistance program.
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States therefore are increasingly interested in establishing two-tier benefit schedules designed
to reduced welfare migration.  They are taking the issue seriously, even if often the symbolic value of21
"welfare magnets" is most useful in rationalizing overall retrenchment of public assistance rather than
as a basis for earnestly dealing with welfare migration.  States are also becoming very creative in
devising schemes that they hope will pass constitutional muster and allow them to discourage welfare
recipients from other states becoming an additional burden to their already pressed fiscal limits.  Yet, if
welfare migration is grossly overstated, or if it is part of a more complex multi-dimensional
phenomenon of poor persons escaping intolerable conditions, then state responses in the form of two-
tier benefit schedules are sorely misplaced.  Instead of fanning the flames of the "welfare magnet"
issue, policymakers around the country ought to be working to improve opportunities for persons living
in poverty everywhere.
CONCLUSION
Given the spottiness of evidence on welfare migration even in particular locales where there is
reason to think that it is substantial, one has to wonder about the advantages of instituting two-tier
benefit schedules.  Their major consequence may be in reinforcing prejudices against welfare recipients
generally as people who are looking to get something for nothing.  Welfare magnet reforms may
largely encourage greater suspicion of the poor.  In the process, such actions may do little more than
undermine public support for more ambitious efforts to assist the poor and provide them with the
resources and supportive services that can enable them to improve their life chances.
But the growing popularity of the two-tier benefit schedule suggests that many state
policymakers take the welfare migration issue seriously and are interested in addressing it on
substantive more so than symbolic grounds.  These policymakers do not just talk about their states
becoming welfare magnets; they legislate against them.
Nonetheless, while there surely is welfare migration, the extent of such migration into any one
state remains unknown.  In many cases, it may be quite marginal after the net effects of welfare22
migration out of the state are taken into account.  Whether two-tier benefit schedules are the best way
to solve the issue is also open to question.  This is especially the case if, as Peterson and Rom have
suggested, the welfare magnet issue is not so much about the attraction of out-of-state residents as it is
about the retention of in-state residents.  Also, if in fact welfare migration is really most often part of a
more complex migration decision, two-tier benefit schedules are not likely to stem the flow of people
moving from one state to another.  If migration is more strongly associated with pressing push factors,
such as attempts to flee desperate circumstances, than with the pull of higher welfare benefits, then
public policy needs to be directed at addressing the circumstances that are motivating migration. 
Lastly, whatever the conclusions about welfare migration, two-tier benefit schedules may not survive
constitutional challenges.
Therefore, welfare reform has to be about more than the interstate conflict over who pays for
which welfare recipients.  If it is not, then states will continue on in their competition to keep welfare
benefits down and will further pursue efforts to limit access to public assistance.  The growing furor
over welfare magnets thus underscores the limitations of state welfare reform and the need for a
national policy change that rises above parochial state interests.   The obsession with welfare magnets
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also points to how state welfare reform remains mired in limited issues that only address the symptoms
and not the causes of welfare dependency and poverty.  Given the evidence that migration by the poor
is often associated with escaping desperate circumstances, these reforms must be larger than anything
concentrated on welfare per se.  It is necessary to address urban decay and rural decline, the decline of
employment for unskilled workers, the deterioration of public schools, the rising problems of drugs, and
the breakdown of social norms more generally.
Now more than ever before the solutions to welfare dependency lie outside the welfare system
itself in economic and social policies that will promote growth and build community in ways that
include and not exclude persons living in poverty.  While President Clinton has sought to "end welfare23
as we know it," the welfare magnet issue suggests that this includes ending extensive reliance on the
states for finding solutions to the welfare dependency problem.  Only a national commitment to
addressing the root causes of welfare migration and other practices associated with poverty will provide
an adequate response.  2425
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